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A Preliminary Response to Criticisms of the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998
T. Jeremy Gunn ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the U.S. Congress expressed its growing concern about
violations of religious freedom abroad by enacting the International
Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (“IRFA”).1 IRFA directs the U.S.
government generally—and the U.S. Department of State in particular—to play a more active role in promoting freedom of religion
abroad. Although little has been published about IRFA, some scholars, human rights activists, and foreign observers view IRFA with
suspicion.2
There are significant misunderstandings about IRFA, both by its
supporters within the United States and by its critics in the United

∗ Attorney, Washington, D.C. The author was a Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of
Peace in 1998-99, during which he worked at the Office of International Religious Freedom at
the U.S. Department of State. He is now Senior Fellow for Religion and Human Rights at
Emory University. The views expressed herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. Institute of Peace. The author
wishes to thank Marc Porter and John Smith for their assistance in preparation of this article.
1. See 22 U.S.C.
6401 (1998), amended by Pub. L. No. 106-55, 113 Stat. 401
(1999). For the Public Law version of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998
(“IRFA”), see Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787 (1998). For a brief discussion of the history leading to the adoption of IRFA, see infra Part II.
2. The author heard the criticisms by foreign government officials while at the Department of State as well as criticisms by scholars and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
in conferences, colloquia, and seminars. Unfortunately, there have been few published articles
that articulate the criticisms that are commonly shared by informed people outside the United
States and by some scholars and NGO activists within the United States. One of the first efforts to address IRFA systematically came at a conference entitled “Religious Persecution as a
U.S. Policy Issue,” sponsored by the Center for the Study of Religion in Public Life at Trinity
College in Hartford, Connecticut, on September 26-27, 1999. See RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION
AS A U.S. POLICY ISSUE: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONSULTATION HELD AT TRINITY COLLEGE,
HARTFORD (Rosalind I.J. Hackett et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter HARTFORD CONFERENCE].
The participants at the Hartford Conference identified most of the criticisms that have been
levied against IRFA. See discussion infra Part III; see also Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Exporting
Religion: Where the Religious Freedom Act Fails, COMMONWEAL, Feb. 26, 1999, at 10. Professor Sullivan and the author were among the participants at the Hartford Conference.
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States and abroad. Its supporters are often unaware of the negative
response that IRFA has provoked from abroad. To many of its critics, the law appears to be an attempt by the United States to employ
the blunt tool of sanctions to promote unilaterally a peculiarly
American agenda. But the critics of IRFA often have an inaccurate
understanding of the genesis of the law and how the law actually is
implemented by the U.S. government. This Article provides a preliminary discussion of some of the important criticisms that have
been levied against IRFA and urges that there be a more informed
discussion of the issues by both supporters and critics of the law.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF 1998
By 1996, the issue of religious discrimination and persecution
abroad captured the attention of several members of Congress and
their staffs. Early that year, the International Operations and Human
Rights Subcommittee of the House of Representatives held hearings
on the worldwide persecution of Christians3 and Jews.4 Following
the hearings, Congress adopted resolutions on the persecution of
Christians5 and on the persecution of Baha’is in Iran.6 Later that
year, in conjunction with the passage of the Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1997, the Managers’ Statement
requested that the Department of State report to the Congress on
the persecution of Christians throughout the world.7 As interest in
the issue of persecution and religious freedom continued to mount,
some members of Congress came to believe that the United States
was not doing enough to respond to the abuses of religious freedom
and that Congress should enact a law requiring the U.S. government
and the U.S. Department of State to become more fully engaged in
the issue.
3. See Persecution of Christians Worldwide: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations and Human Rights of the Comm. on Int’l Relations of the House Subcomm. on Int’l Relations, 104th Cong. (1996).
4. See Worldwide Persecution of Jews: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations
and Human Rights of the House Comm. on Int’l Relations, 104th Cong. (1996).
5. See S. Con. Res. 71, 104th Cong. (1996).
6. See H.R. Con. Res. 102, 104th Cong. (1996).
7. The report was released, in photocopy format, on July 22, 1997, as UNITED STATES
POLICIES IN SUPPORT OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: FOCUS ON CHRISTIANS (Report Consistent
with the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1997, H.R. REP. NO. 3610).
See also U.S. Department of State Web Site (visited Aug. 22, 2000) <http://www.state.gov/
www/global/human_rights/970722_relig_rpt_christian.html>.
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On May 20, 1997, Republican Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia introduced H.R. 1685, a bill to “establish an Office of Religious Persecution Monitoring, to provide for the imposition of sanctions against countries engaged in a pattern of religious persecution,
and for other purposes.”8 This bill, the first version of what was to
become IRFA, was popularly known as the “Wolf-Specter” bill. It
prompted an intense debate within the U.S. government, religious
groups, and the business community.9 The most controversial provision of the Wolf-Specter bill was its requirement that the U.S. government automatically impose sanctions on countries found to be
violators of international religious freedom, a provision that the Clinton Administration strongly opposed. After holding hearings in late
1997, the House International Relations Committee worked for six
months to revise the original Wolf-Specter bill and introduced an
amended version as H.R. 2431 in 1998.10 H.R. 2431, as amended,
passed the House on May 14, 1998, as the “Freedom From Religious Persecution Act of 1998” and was sent to the Senate. In a surprise move, shortly before the Senate was scheduled to vote on the
House version, Senator Nickles introduced a significantly revised version of the bill, which the Senate adopted unanimously on October
9, 1998, under the title “International Religious Freedom Act of
1998.” By voice vote, the House unanimously approved the Senate
version the following day. President Clinton signed IRFA into law
on October 27, 1998.
IRFA created three new entities within the U.S. government to
promote international religious freedom: the Office on International
Religious Freedom within the Department of State, headed by an
Ambassador-at-Large; an independent nine-member Commission on
International Religious Freedom (with the Ambassador-at-Large
serving as an additional ex officio member); and a special adviser on
international religious freedom at the National Security Council.11
8. H.R. 1685, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 772, 105th Cong. (1997).
9. See, e.g., the testimony of the Honorable John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State
for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, before the House International Relations Committee, Sept. 9, 1997, U.S. Department of State Web Site (visited Aug. 22, 2000) <http://
www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/970722.shattuck.html>. See also Jeffrey Goldberg,
Washington Discovers Christian Persecution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 21, 1997, at 46.
10. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-480, pt. 1, at 15 (1998).
11. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6411, 6431 (1998); 50 U.S.C. § 402(i) (1998). The Office of
International Religious Freedom has been placed organizationally within the Department of
State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and is designated “DRL/IRF” within
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The law imposes a number of responsibilities on the Office of International Religious Freedom, including issuing an annual report on
the status of religious freedom on each foreign country, advising the
President and Secretary of State on religious freedom abroad, and
representing the United States with foreign governments on issues of
religious freedom.12 The report, to be issued in September of each
year, also must identify those countries of the world that “violate”
religious freedom, especially those that commit “particularly severe
violations of religious freedom.”13
III. CRITICISMS AND RESPONSES
I am made very uncomfortable in countries around the world when
I get complaints from well-meaning citizens about the U.S.’s moral
meddling in their affairs. And I get these complaints even from
people who[m] you would think would gain from the U.S.’s role as
a kind of policeman and vigilant monitor of rights. It makes me
uneasy, especially when they call to mind instances such as Waco or
our policies towards Native Americans, our racial tensions and so
on.

—Professor Jay Demerath at the Hartford Conference14
Possibly the most frequently heard complaint from abroad regarding IRFA is that the United States has, once again, taken upon
itself the role of “moral watchdog” or “moral policeman” for the
world. To foreign observers, it may well appear that the United
States, which already issues an annual Country Reports on Human
Rights, is now intervening one step further by criticizing states on
what may well be regarded as the most difficult and sensitive human

the Department of State. The Ambassador-at-Large also serves as an ex officio member of the
Commission on International Religious Freedom. See 22 U.S.C. § 6431(b)(1)(A). President
Clinton appointed the Honorable Robert A. Seiple to be the first Ambassador-at-Large for
International Religious Freedom shortly after IRFA was signed into law. Ambassador Seiple
resigned effective September 2000.
12. See 22 U.S.C. § 6411(c).
13. Id. § 102(b)(1)(A). See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT:
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 1999, REPORT TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Joint
Comm. Print 2000) [hereinafter 1999 RELIGION REPORT]. The first report was issued on September 9, 1999. The second report was issued on September 5, 2000.
14. HARTFORD CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 20.
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rights issue: the freedom of religion and belief. As a vastly more
complex issue than freedom from torture or freedom of expression,
the freedom of religion and belief is necessarily intertwined with each
country’s particular identity, traditions, culture, and nationhood.
The discussion below identifies six of the recurring and interrelated criticisms leveled at IRFA and replies briefly to each. Although
these criticisms are not exhaustive, they include those most frequently raised.
A. Criticism 1: IRFA Promotes an American Model of Separation of
Church and State that Does Not Conform to the Histories, Traditions,
and Cultures of Other Societies
[IRFA] is premised on an American understanding of religious
freedom and practice, including notions of “disestablishment” or
separation of church and state. This is problematic as a basis for the
protection of freedom of religion at a global level because of fundamental differences about what “freedom of religion” means.

—Professor Abdullahi An-Na’im at the Hartford Conference15
Professor An-Na’im correctly identifies perhaps the most important criticism that is offered against IRFA from outside the United
States: that it promotes an American model of separation of church
and state that is anathema to other societies and cultures. Such a
criticism can be directed both at the way IRFA presents itself as well
as at the underlying American failure to understand traditions and
cultures that differ from its own.
IRFA’s own rhetoric gives credence to the criticism that it is
based narrowly on the American historical experience:
The right to freedom of religion undergirds the very origin and existence of the United States. Many of our Nation’s founders fled
religious persecution abroad, cherishing in their hearts and minds
the ideal of religious freedom. They established in law, as a fundamental right and as a pillar of our Nation, the right to freedom of
religion. From its birth to this day, the United States has prized
this legacy of religious freedom and honored this heritage by

15. HARTFORD CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 22.

845

GUN-FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/25/00 9:40 PM

[2000

standing for religious freedom and offering refuge to those suffering religious persecution.16

This description of the American founders as having established freedom of religion as a pillar of the nation is seriously misleading, if not
incorrect.17 It triumphantly conveys an idealized self-image that
would be unrecognizable to many religious minorities, including
Catholics, Jews, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Quakers, Hindus,
and Buddhists, who originally suffered from discrimination or violence in the United States. While it is true that some religious believers originally came to America to escape persecution, it is also true
that many of them, upon arriving, promptly launched their own
forms of religious persecution and intolerance against others. The religious freedom that exists in the United States today came not as a
cherished legacy ceremoniously handed down from the founding fathers, as IRFA suggests, but emerged only after many painful political and legal struggles by minority religions against societal intolerance. Unfortunately, IRFA’s idealized history can send a message to
foreign observers that is counterproductive to IRFA’s important
goals, for it may wrongly imply that the United States has long been
the beacon of full religious liberty and that other countries should
attempt to emulate an American model.
While inserting such an idealized history in IRFA was rhetorically
counterproductive, at least from the perspective of dispassionate foreign observers, it is nevertheless important to note that the Department of State itself does not convey such a message either in its public reporting or in its diplomatic negotiations. The Department of
State identifies the official U.S. position as follows:
Grounded in and informed by the American experience, in which
religious liberty is “the first freedom” of the Constitution, the law
nevertheless does not attempt to impose “the American way” on
other nations. Rather, it draws on the internationally accepted belief in the inviolable dignity of the human person and of the universal rights that flow from that belief. These rights are reflected in international covenants, which are, in turn, cited in the Act as key

16. 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(1).
17. Professor Sullivan correctly criticized IRFA for providing an inaccurate and idealized
version of American history. See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 11.
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standards on religious freedom by which governments—including
that of the United States—must be judged.18

The Department of State correctly identifies religious liberty not as
the oldest of American rights but as the first to have been enumerated in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.
More importantly, the Department of State refers to the international human rights instruments that IRFA itself identifies as the
guiding norms by which the United States also should be judged.
The legislative findings of IRFA itself include the recognition that:
(2) Freedom of religious belief and practice is a universal human
right and fundamental freedom articulated in numerous international instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the Helsinki Accords, the Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, the United Nations Charter, and the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
(3) Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship, and observance.” Article 18(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes
that “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and
teaching.” Governments have the responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of their citizens and to pursue justice for all. Religious freedom is a fundamental right of every individual, regardless
of race, sex, country, creed, or nationality, and should never be arbitrarily abridged by any government.19

Thus, the Department of State and IRFA (setting aside some of its
rhetoric) acknowledge that both the United States and other countries should be held to the standards adopted by the international
18. 1999 RELIGION REPORT, supra note 13, at 2 (Introduction).
19. 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(2)-(3).
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community and not by an American model of church-state separation. The United States, officially, does not apply American standards on freedom of religion to others nor does it excuse itself from
complying with international norms.20
Professor An-Na’im’s important criticism cannot be answered
fully, however, simply by pointing to the official positions and intentions of the U.S. government. Americans, like all people, are capable
of conflating their own parochial beliefs with idealized international
norms. Whereas Americans might argue that they are promoting international standards, they might, in fact, simply be promoting their
own system. It is reasonable to suspect that Americans’ interpretation of international instruments will be influenced by the American
historical experience, just as it would be reasonable to suspect that
others also will interpret the meaning of international instruments
through their own historical and cultural experiences.
Although each country has its own unique history and traditions,
it is possible to identify two general types for the purpose of illustrating how a misunderstanding can develop between Americans and
others regarding the meaning of religious freedom.
In most countries of the world, a dominant religious tradition
played a disproportionately influential role in shaping the modern
histories of those countries as well as helped form their cultures, traditions, and institutions. Catholicism played such a role in, for example, Latin America, Spain, Italy, Austria, and Poland. Lutheranism
was such a religion in (northern) Germany, Scandinavia, and Estonia.
Christian Orthodoxy is dominant not only in Russia, but throughout
eastern and south-eastern Europe. Islam, in its many forms, is the
dominant religious influence in the Maghreb, the Levant, the Middle
East, Central Asia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. In such countries, the dominant religious tradition is not a mere cultural gloss,
but has been deeply influential in shaping national and personal
identity. As a part of the popular culture, it will be assumed that “to
be Polish is to be Catholic,” “to be Greek is to be Orthodox,” and
“to be a Saudi is to be a Wahhabi Muslim.” In such countries, religion is not a matter of individual choice, but is an integral part of personal identity and is almost akin to one’s race, native language, and

20. The author is aware of no instance where the Department of State has suggested to
a foreign government that it should implement a U.S. model; rather, the benchmark is always
presented as the language of the international instruments.

848

GUN-FIN.DOC

841]

9/25/00 9:40 PM

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998

family. In such countries, governmental and political support to the
traditional religion is not seen as a violation of religious freedom but
as a means to support religion and religious freedom of the vast majority of citizens.
Moreover, it is quite common in many countries (including several in Europe) for the law to limit the number of religious groups
that are able to receive a range of legal benefits. Consequently, a
two-tiered system that provides different rights for religious groups
depending on the type of legal recognition they receive is quite
common.21 Thus, a few of the larger or more traditional religions
commonly receive state benefits, including tax-exempt status, legal
personality, state-financed religious education, and state-supported
religious schools. These benefits are denied to other religious
groups, even though members of those groups also are taxpayers and
citizens. Governments frequently defend such practices as “protecting” citizens from foreign or unknown religions.
In the United States, on the other hand, religious affiliation is
now generally understood to be a matter of personal choice. Although children may be born and raised in a particular religious tradition, as adults they will be free to convert to other faiths. While
popular prejudices against some religions surely inhibit the range of
personal choices, the dominant presumption in the United States is
that religious affiliation is a matter to be decided by the individual
and that such decisions should not undercut civil standing or political rights. This indulgence for personal choice in turn spawns a wide
variety of religious groups from which the individual may choose. Although the United States continues to be predominantly Christian
and Protestant, the range of choices both within and outside of
Christianity is quite high. Similarly, Americans generally believe that
governments should not provide financial support to specific religions and certainly should not select a particular religious doctrine as
an established or state religion. These two types of system (“traditional” versus “individual choice”), though overly simplified here,
illustrate a fundamental difference in how religious freedom is commonly understood outside and inside the United States.
21. For the most important publication describing this issue, see W. COLE DURHAM,
JR., FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: LAWS AFFECTING THE STRUCTURING OF RELIGIOUS
COMMUNITIES (1999). The publication was prepared for and issued by the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe in Warsaw, Poland.
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The Department of State recognizes, in principle, that different
countries have varying approaches to the role of religion in society
that arise from their different traditions.
Occasionally a nation’s policy on religious freedom can be better
understood in the context of its history, culture, and tradition—a
particular religion may have dominated the life of a nation for centuries, making more difficult the acceptance of new faiths that offer
challenges in both cultural and theological terms. But tradition and
culture should not be used as a pretext for legislation or policies
that restrict genuine religious belief or its legitimate manifestations.22

While formally recognizing the cultural and historical differences, the
United States nevertheless argues, correctly, that differences of religious and cultural traditions do not exempt states from complying
with international standards. Indeed, international human rights law
is created for the purpose of bringing an end to historical and traditional practices that infringe on the rights that are identified in the
international instruments. In fact, it is probably accurate to say that
the classic argument used by those who oppose human rights is that
they undermine traditional practices. Whether it was racial segregation in the American South, apartheid in South Africa, or the denial
of the right of women to vote in Switzerland, the defenders of those
practices complained that the innovations were inconsistent with the
history, traditions, and cultures of those societies. The point of human rights, however, is to end the historical, traditional, and cultural
practices that discriminate on the basis of race, sex, and religion.23
22. 1999 RELIGION REPORT, supra note 13, at 4.
23. Some examples of nondiscrimination provisions within international conventions
include:
[Purposes of the United Nations are accomplished in achieving] international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3 (emphasis added).
[The General Assembly shall make recommendations for the purpose of] promoting
international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health
fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion . . . .
Id. at art. 13, para. 1(b) (emphasis added).
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in
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There are ample grounds for discussion and disagreement about
the scope and meaning of the international standards regarding freedom of religion and belief. Americans and their foreign interlocutors
would do well to engage in a serious discussion about how the
United States and the world community can better understand the
proper scope of the freedom of religion and belief and to end discrimination on the basis of religion and belief. The United States
would do well to understand how different traditions have shaped
viewpoints about the meaning of religious freedom. It also would be
appropriate for foreign observers to examine how their traditions of
dominant religions and state-approved religions can lead to discrimination against newer and minority religions whose rights are fully
protected under ratified international human rights instruments.
B. Criticism 2: IRFA Reflects the Political Interests of the Christian
Right in the United States and Promotes Missionary Religions
I think the legislative history of this Act will probably reflect there
was a great deal of interest in protecting the rights of Christians
and so forth when the bill was conceived and also when people responded, constituents and so forth. So I think that the burden is
probably on the U.S. government to show that in this Act they’re
not engaging in crusading or proselytization [sic] on behalf of the
Christian religion. . . . I see here that [the proponents of IRFA] are
trying to be sensitive to that, and trying not to create that

the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art.
2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (emphasis added).
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Id. at art. 26 (emphasis added).
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.
[European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 14, 312 U.N.T.S. 221.
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impression. But I think it’s certainly an uphill battle in terms of
world opinion.

—Ms. Jemera Rone at the Hartford Conference24
Jemera Rone, an African specialist at Human Rights Watch,
identifies here two interrelated and widely shared foreign criticisms
of IRFA: that the Christian right successfully pressured Congress
into adopting legislation favoring Christianity and that it is designed,
in part, to promote American missionary activities abroad. Some foreign officials have even suggested in private exchanges that they
sympathize with American diplomats who must include religious
freedom in negotiations in order to appease politically powerful domestic groups.
There are a number of understandable reasons why observers
might reach such conclusions. As was discussed above, some of the
actions by Congress in 1996 and 1997 focused conspicuously on
Christian concerns.25 The emergence of this Congressional interest
was associated with some highly publicized contemporaneous allegations that Christians are the “most persecuted” people in the
world.26 It is frequently reported and widely believed, albeit inaccurately, that the early drafts of IRFA focused exclusively on protecting
Christians from persecution.27 It is true that the draft legislation was
endorsed and promoted, at different points, by some influential
groups associated with the religious right, including the National Association of Evangelicals, the Southern Baptist Ethics and Religious

24. HARTFORD CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 56.
25. See supra notes 3, 7 and accompanying text.
26. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 48; see also PAUL MARSHALL, THEIR BLOOD CRIES
OUT: THE WORLDWIDE TRAGEDY OF MODERN CHRISTIANS WHO ARE DYING FOR THEIR
FAITH (1997); NINA SHEA, IN THE LIONS DEN: PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS AND WHAT THE
WESTERN CHURCH CAN DO ABOUT IT (1997); Linda Lawson, Christians Labeled “Most Persecuted”, BAPTIST PRESS, Dec. 26, 1996 (visited Aug. 22, 2000) <http://www.umr.org
/Htpersec.htm>.
27. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 2, at 10 (“The act, and its predecessor versions, some
of which targeted only the persecution of Christians . . . .”). The Wolf-Specter bill, H.R. 1685,
105th Cong.
2(3) (1997), cited “[p]ersecution of religious believers, particularly Roman
Catholic and evangelical Protestant Christians [by] Communist countries.” But the WolfSpecter bill did not pertain solely to persecuted Christians. It also referred to the “persecution
of Baha’is, Christians, and other religious minorities” in Iran, id. § 2(4), to Tibetan Buddhists,
id. § 2(6), and to Sudan’s “religious war against Christian, non-Muslim, and moderate Muslim
persons,” id. § 2(5).

h

852

GUN-FIN.DOC

841]

9/25/00 9:40 PM

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998

Liberty Committee, the Christian Coalition, the Family Research
Council, Evangelicals for Social Action, and the Prison Fellowship.28
While it is fair to say that many influential groups affiliated with
the Christian right campaigned for the law that ultimately became
IRFA, their influence should not be overestimated or interpreted
without nuance. One of the legislative staffers who worked on the
legislation responded to this perception as follows:
It has seemed from several comments that some of you carry the
suspicion that this Act was the work of the religious right. While it
is undoubtedly true that there are many in the religious right who
care deeply about this issue, this suspicion of their involvement
with this bill is one which those of us who worked on the Act
would view with a certain degree of irony, because we had such
mixed experience and even some frustrations at times with the religious right. I do not want to get into naming names, but in one instance, for example, when Laura Bryant raised a couple of substantive questions about the Wolf-Specter bill, she was told by one
leader that it was because of people like her that the Nazis succeeded in sending millions to the death camps, and she was standing in the way of large numbers of religious believers being saved
from a similar fate.29

The text of IRFA uses the word “Christians” only twice, and then
only by way of reference to the resolutions that were adopted by the
previous Congress.30 The words “Catholic,” “Protestant,” and
“Evangelical,” do not appear in the text. (Nor do the words “Muslim,” “Islam,” “Buddhist,” or “Hindu” for that matter.) The language of IRFA does not highlight persecution of any particular
group but refers instead to the touchstone “international” and “universal” standards that are identified as the guiding norms for IRFA.
IRFA, as enacted, did not reflect the narrow support of a particular
group but was adopted unanimously in both the Senate and the
House and ultimately was supported by the Clinton administration.
28. See Christy Cutbill McCormick, Exporting the First Amendment: America’s Response
to Religious Persecution Abroad, 4 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 283, 330 (1998). For brief histories
of the legislative and lobbying process that culminated in IRFA, see, for example, id. at 28389, and Kristin N. Wuerffel, Discrimination Among Rights?: A Nation’s Legislating a Hierarchy of Human Rights in the Context of International Human Rights Customary Law, 33 VAL.
U.L. REV. 369, 412 n.12 (1998). See also Goldberg supra note 9, at 48.
29. HARFORD CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 58 (John Hanford, legislative aid to Senator Lugar).
30. See 22 U.S.C. § 640(a)(7) (1998).
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Regardless of its parentage and textual wording, IRFA can be
criticized in practice for focusing disproportionately on religious issues of particular concern to Americans, including difficulties encountered abroad by American missionaries and by religions that are
particularly identified with the United States origination, such as the
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Mormons. For example, it is probably
fair to say that the Department of State’s annual Country Reports on
Human Rights and the U.S. Department of State Annual Report on
International Religious Freedom demonstrate a relatively greater
awareness of difficulties encountered by Protestant Evangelical,
Catholic, and Jewish communities abroad than, for example, the
problems encountered by Muslims and Orthodox Christians.31 There
is, in a word, under-reporting by the Department of State of discrimination suffered by certain groups that are relatively underrepresented in the United States.
This is not to say, however, that such violations go totally unreported or that there is an intentional policy of omission.32 The explanation is in some measure due to the simple fact that overworked
and understaffed U.S. embassies are more likely to report on problems that are brought to their attention than they are on problems
that would need to be researched. American missionaries abroad are
becoming increasingly well aware that they can report difficulties
they encounter, whether in obtaining visas or distributing literature,
to appropriate U.S. embassies or the Department of State in Washington and that they are increasingly likely to receive helpful responses. In contrast, it is probably not obvious to Muslims living in
Norway or Old Believers living in Russia that they should report on
incidents of discrimination to U.S. embassies in Oslo and Moscow
respectively.33 With additional time and resources, the quality and
31. The author has also heard the criticism that IRFA is designed to protect only rights
of religion rather than rights of religion or belief—and thus that the United States is not actually promoting the international standard but only the religious component of the international
standard. There is, in fact, only modest reporting by the Department of State on belief-related
rights of atheists and agnostics.
32. For example, the controversies surrounding the right of religious Muslim women to
wear headscarves are included in the 1999 RELIGION REPORT, supra note 13, for Azerbaijan,
Turkey, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.
33. The author had a conversation with a Norwegian Muslim on exactly this point. She
commented that the religious freedom report on Norway was overly generous to the government and under-reported discrimination suffered by Muslims. She acknowledged that it had
not occurred to her or to other Muslims to convey such information to the U.S. embassy in
Oslo.
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thoroughness of the reporting should improve. While the Department of State continues in its efforts to enhance the quality and consistency of its reporting, significant logistical and practical obstacles
remain. We can hope that, over time, people will bring to the attention of U.S. officials examples of violations of religious freedom and
that the quality of reporting will improve.
While working at the Department of State and while participating in discussions with foreign governments, the author observed no
obvious effort by the United States to favor Christians nor to seek
remedies for Christian groups at the expense of other faiths. Indeed,
the United States voiced concerns to the Greek government, for example, about the rights of Muslims in Greece just as it voiced concerns to the Turkish government about the rights of Greek Orthodox believers in Turkey. In relations with governments in western
Europe, the United States has expressed concern about several new
religious groups, some of whom were Protestant, but most of whom
were not. Moreover, U.S. embassy officials are increasingly making
efforts to reach out to a range of religious groups that suffer discrimination. The Office of International Religious Freedom has
taken concerted efforts to reach out to Muslim communities that
traditionally have had relatively less access to the foreign policy machinery than have Christian and Jewish groups.
IRFA, as correctly suggested by Jemera Rone, also is seen as
promoting the work of American missionaries abroad. For some critics, the providing of political support to missionaries who encounter
difficulties abroad can be seen to be a part of the larger problem of
American insensitivity and indifference to foreign histories, traditions, religions, and cultures. To such observers, the United States
may be characterized as constantly selling to others its superficially
appealing but ultimately shallow exports, whether they be McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, Disneyland, sneakers, blue jeans, rock music, or
motion pictures. IRFA thus may be seen as an effort to export and
defend yet another product: American religions and missionaries.34
34. Foreign observers sometimes caricature the American religious culture as embodying
a “consumer market” ethos. The critics will see American missionaries abroad as salesman exporting and attempting to fulfill their quotas of converts and thereby gain a “market share”
over their competitors. Such missionaries are said to use sophisticated “sales techniques” to
gain new customers at the expense of religions that have failed to modernize and have lost
touch with their own “consumer base” through poor advertising. Countries with more traditional approaches to regulation of religion may well find such analogies to be persuasive and to
be consistent with other fears about the growing influence of American popular culture.
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But the correct issue is not whether religious communities in the
United States have an overabundance of missionary zeal, but
whether governments should be permitted to restrict freedom of expression on matters of religion or restrict the right of people to receive information about religion. Though new forms of religion may
appear to undermine traditional beliefs, international covenants do
not permit limitations on expression on the grounds that such expression is anathema to history, tradition, and culture. International
standards, moreover, suggest that missionaries do have a right to
freedom of expression,35 that individuals have the freedom to change
their religious beliefs,36 and that individuals have the right to receive
information.37
C. Criticism 3: IRFA Improperly Establishes a Hierarchy of Human
Rights and Places Religion at the Zenith
There has been some suggestion that IRFA constitutes an effort
to establish a hierarchy of rights and to place religious freedom at its
zenith.38 It should not be surprising if many IRFA supporters might
believe that religious freedom is the most important human right any
more than it would be surprising to learn that other human rights
advocates believe that freedom from torture or freedom of expression to be the most important human rights. It is only natural that
people involved in human rights campaigns are attracted to work on
The country that has responded with possibly the strongest reaction against foreign
missionaries has been Russia. For a number of articles describing this reaction, see
PROSELYTISM AND ORTHODOXY IN RUSSIA: THE NEW WAR FOR SOULS (John Witte Jr. &
Michael Bourdeaux eds., 1999).
35. See, e.g., Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (¶ 31) (1993)
(“According to Article 9 [of the European Convention on Human Rights], freedom to manifest one’s religion is not only exercisable in community with others, ‘in public’ and within the
circle of those whose faith one shares, but can also be asserted ‘alone’ and ‘in private’; furthermore, it includes in principle the right to try to convince one’s neighbour, for example through
‘teaching’, failing which, moreover, ‘freedom to change [one’s] religion or belief’, enshrined in
Article 9, would be likely to remain a dead letter.”).
36. See id.
37. See, e.g., Leander Case, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 29 (¶ 74) (1987) (“[T]he
right to freedom to receive information basically prohibits a Government from restricting a
person from receiving information that others wish or may be willing to impart to him.”).
38. For a discussion of this issue, see Wuerffel, supra note 28. Mickey Spiegel of Human
Rights Watch similarly raised the concern about creating a hierarchy of rights, particularly
when rights in reality should be understood to be interconnected. See HARTFORD
CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 18-19. See also the September 9, 1997, testimony of John
Shattuck, supra note 9.
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the particular issues of greatest personal significance to them. It is
understandable that some people believe that the right of conscience
is the most sensitive right and needs the most protection.
Regardless of the motivations of the law’s supporters, IRFA and
the Department of State do not assert that religion is the most important human right, nor do they emphasize the importance of religious freedom to the exclusion of other rights. The fact that Congress adopted legislation does not signify, in and of itself, that
religion should be placed at the top of a hierarchy. The legislation
need signify only that religious freedom is a right that has been relatively neglected by governments and international organizations and
that it needs greater protection. IRFA does not create a hierarchy;
rather, it highlights an important, vulnerable, and heretofore neglected right.
D. Criticism 4: IRFA is Designed to Punish Countries by the
Unilateral Imposition of Sanctions by the United States
The original Wolf-Specter bill contained provisions that imposed
economic sanctions automatically on countries that were found to
engage in religious persecution.39 These provisions generated the
greatest opposition from the Clinton Administration and the business community.40 However, unlike the Wolf-Specter bill, IRFA does
not impose automatic sanctions. Instead, it provides the President
with a menu of fifteen enumerated “presidential actions,” any one of
which should be imposed against countries that are identified by the

39. See H.R. 1685, 105th Cong. (1997). In brief, the Wolf-Specter bill created an Office of Religious Persecution Monitoring within the Executive Office of the President. See H.R.
1685, § 5. The Director of the Office of Persecution Monitoring (“Director”), who was to be
appointed by the President, see id. § 5(b), was charged with the responsibility of, inter alia,
“determin[ing] whether a particular country is engaged in . . . religious persecution, and identify[ing] the responsible entities within such countries.” Id. § 5(e)(4). Once a country had
been so designated, Wolf-Specter provided that the appropriate agencies within the U.S. government “shall—(i) prohibit all exports to the responsible entities . . . and (ii) prohibit the export to such country . . . products, goods, and services: that had been identified by the Director.” Id. § 7(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The President was nevertheless authorized, under
certain circumstances, to waive the sanctions for periods of not more than 12 months. See id. §
8(a).
40. For the Clinton Administration’s position on sanctions generally, see Stuart E.
Eizenstat’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 1, 1999. See Stuart
E. Eizenstat et al., U.S. Department of State, On-the-Record Briefing on the International Religious Freedom Act (visited Aug. 22, 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/
1998/981009_eizen_etal_relig.html>.
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Department of State as violators of religious freedom.41 They include
issuing a private demarche, withdrawal of foreign aid, and blocking
commercial contracts.42 The President also is authorized to take an

41. 22 U.S.C. § 6445.
42. The fifteen enumerated actions are:
(1) A private demarche.
(2) An official public demarche.
(3) A public condemnation.
(4) A public condemnation within one or more multilateral fora.
(5) The delay or cancellation of one or more scientific exchanges.
(6) The delay or cancellation of one or more cultural exchanges.
(7) The denial of one or more working, official, or state visits.
(8) The delay or cancellation of one or more working, official, or state visits.
(9) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States development assistance in accordance with section 2151n of this title.
(10) Directing the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, or the Trade and Development Agency not to approve the
issuance of any (or a specified number of) guarantees, insurance, extensions of
credit, or participations in the extension of credit with respect to the specific government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President
to be responsible for violations under section 6441 or 6442 of this title.
(11) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States security assistance in
accordance with section 2304 of this title.
(12) Consistent with section 262d of this title, directing the United States executive
directors of international financial institutions to oppose and vote against loans primarily benefiting the specific foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or official
found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section
6441 or 6442 or this title.
(13) Ordering the heads of the appropriate United States agencies not to issue any
(or a specified number of) specific licenses, and not to grant any other specific authority (or a specific number of authorities), to export any goods or technology to
the specific foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 6441 or 6442
of this title, under –
(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979 [50 U.S.C. 2401 et seq.];
(B) the Arms Export Control Act [22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.];
(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.]; or
(D) any other statue that requires the prior review and approval of the United
States Government as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or services.
(14) Prohibiting any United States financial institution from making loans or
providing credits totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-month period to the
specific foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined
by the President to be responsible for violations under section 6441 or 6442 of this
title.
(15) Prohibiting the United States Government from procuring, or entering into
any contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from the foreign government, entities, or officials found or determined by the President to be responsible
for violations under section 6441 or 6442 of this title.
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appropriate “commensurate” action, even if it is not included in the
list of fifteen.43 Unlike the Wolf-Specter bill, IRFA does not use the
term “sanction” to describe the enumerated presidential actions.
Both publicly and privately, the first Ambassador-at-Large advised
that IRFA is not designed to punish violators but to promote religious freedom. In his September 9, 1999 press conference announcing the release of the first religion report, Ambassador Seiple stated:
This International Religious Freedom Act is designed to promote
religious freedom. [W]e desperately want to work with those countries in the promotion around the common agenda in ways that will
enhance religious freedom for their people.

...
. . . We do not look at this bill as a punitive bill. We do not look
at this bill as a way to punish people. We do not look at this bill as
a moral high ground for one country against another. We are in the
business of promoting international religious freedom; we will work
with anyone who will work with us to enhance that right.44

In the minds of some foreign officials, however, IRFA retains the
vestigial legacy of the automatic sanctions provision of the WolfSpecter bill.45
Although the law does not provide for “sanctions” per se, it does
require that the President undertake one of the fifteen specified actions against “violators” of religious freedom as well as one of six

22 U.S.C. § 6445(a) (citations omitted).
43. According to 22 U.S.C. § 6445(b),
Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the President may substitute
any other action authorized by law for any action described in paragraphs (1)
through (15) of subsection (a) of this section if such action is commensurated in effort to the action substituted and if the action would further the policy of the
United States set forth in section 6401(b) of this title. The President shall seek to
take all appropriate and feasible actions authorized by law to obtain the cessation of
the violations. If commensurate action is taken, the President shall report such action, together with an explanation for taking such action, to the appropriate congressional committees.
44. Robert Seiple & Harold Hongju Koh, Briefing, Release of the 1999 Annual Report
on International Religious Freedom, U.S. Department of State Web Site (visited Aug. 22,
2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990909_seiple_koh_irf.html>.
45. In the author’s experience, officials of foreign governments who are aware of IRFA
typically assume that it operates in the manner initially proposed by the Wolf-Specter bill.
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actions against those countries designated as “particularly severe violators.”46
While it is correct to say that a “presidential action” must be
taken against each state identified as a “violator,” a private demarche—a confidential communication between governments—
satisfies this requirement.47 This falls well short of the automatic
sanctions that bore the brunt of criticism surrounding the WolfSpecter legislation.
E. Criticism 5: The United States Acts Hypocritically by Arguing in
Favor of Religious Freedom Abroad While it Commits Human Rights
Abuses at Home
States sometimes respond to U.S. government criticism of their
human rights practices by replying that the United States should not
criticize other states until it perfects its own human rights record.
For example, after the United States criticized French government
policies on religious minorities at a human rights implementation
meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(“OSCE”), the French delegate countered that the United States,
which bears responsibility for the incident of the Branch Davidian

46. See supra note 42 for a listing of the fifteen possible actions. For “particularly severe
violators,” which are also described in the law as “countries of particular concern,” the President must take one of the actions designated as 9 through 15 or some commensurate action.
22 U.S.C. § 6442(c).
At his congressional testimony on October 6, 1999, Ambassador Seiple identified
the five countries designated by the President as “countries of particular concern” for 1999:
Burma (Myanmar), China, Iran, Iraq, and Sudan. Ambassador Seiple also identified “the Taliban in Afghanistan, which we do not recognize as a government, and Serbia, which is not a
country, as particularly severe violators of religious freedom.” Although the Secretary of State’s
official designation of these countries was subsequently forwarded to Congress, neither Congress nor the President has released a copy of that message. Human Rights, and Labor Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations and Human Rights House Comm. on International Relations (visited Aug. 22, 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/
1999/991006_seiple_koh_irf.html> (testimony by Ambassador Robert A. Seiple).
47. According to the Department of State:
The promotion of religious freedom involves far more than public airing of violations. The most productive work often is done behind the scenes, for a very simple
reason: no government or nation is likely to respond with alacrity when publicly rebuked. It is, of course, sometimes necessary for the United States, and the international community, to denounce openly particularly abhorrent behavior by another
nation.
1999 RELIGION REPORT, supra note 13, at 9.
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disaster at Waco, should not criticize other countries.48 The Chinese
government similarly responds to the U.S. Department of State reports issued on its human rights practices. In response to the U.S.
criticisms of China’s crackdown on the Falun Gong, the Chinese
Foreign Ministry announced that “China is indignant over the U.S.
government’s double standard on the Falun Gong Sect. The U.S.
appears to be totally oblivious to the pernicious influence of the sect
in China and continues to meddle in China’s internal affairs.”49
When the United States released the 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the China Society for Human Rights Studies
responded that the “U.S. Government needs to keep an eye on its
own human rights problems, mind its own business and stop interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.”50
If the United States were to assert that it commits no human
rights abuses and that other countries should follow its example, the
criticisms offered by the French government and Chinese government might well be appropriate. But the Department of State does
not lay claim to American perfectionism nor does it hold out the
United States as a role model. When asked whether the United
States complies with international standards for freedom of religion,
Ambassador Seiple responded:
The United States has its imperfections and we do not set ourselves
up as a moral watchdog for the rest of the world. We have problems that we are working on. I think if you look at the history of
the 223 years of this republic, compare that with any other nationstate in the world, we can be very proud of what has happened.
That doesn’t make us perfect and we don’t suggest that that is the
case.51

The United States should not be precluded from calling other
countries to account simply because it has its own failings. Similarly,

48. The November 1998 speech by the French representative was not published or transcribed.
49. Zhang Qiyue, China Against U.S. Double Standard on Falun Gong Cult, CHINA
DAILY, Dec. 7, 1999 (visited Aug. 23, 2000) <http://www.chinadaily.net/falun/c081.htm>.
50. U.S. Human Rights Record in 1999 (visited Aug. 23, 2000) <http://www. humanrights-china.org/en/eindex.html>. The article was prepared by The China Society for Human
Rights Studies, which the official Chinese government web site describes as “a national academic society [that is] a nongovernmental organization in special consultative status with the
United National Economic and Social Council (UNESCO).”
51. Seiple & Koh, supra note 44.
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France and China should not be precluded from criticizing the
United States because of their internal problems. The international
human rights regime assumes mutual accountability; it does not require that the accuser be above reproach.52
F. Criticism 6: The United States Acts Inconsistently on Human Rights
Issues by Advocating International Standards While Acting
Unilaterally
[I]f these are international standards[,] why then are we not part of
an international effort to make changes within some of the countries that we are concerned about?

—Ms. Mickey Spiegel at the Hartford Conference53
[The U.S. should join] other countries in efforts to protect and
promote all human rights, instead of focusing so exclusively on this
particular right [of religious freedom] while refusing to ratify other
international human rights treaties . . . . It is curious that the U.S.
is so protective of its own sovereignty that it refuses to ratify an almost universally ratified treaty like the Rights of the Child Convention, and yet it expects other countries to share its own particular
concern with freedom of religion.
[The] U.S. has consistently refused to be part of the process of developing and implementing international rights, whether on freedom of religion or any other human right, and yet here comes this
“Lone Ranger” effort on this particular freedom.

—Professor Abdullahi An-Na’im at the Hartford Conference54
It is true that the United States does not always act or wish to act
as a full participant in supporting the international human rights re52. By analogy, there are medical doctors who smoke cigarettes even though they know
of the serious risks attached to smoking. If one of these doctors urges a patient not to smoke,
what is the wisest response of a patient who genuinely wishes to improve her health? To criticize the doctor for being a hypocrite? To ignore the doctor’s advice? While accusing the doctor
of hypocrisy may comfort the accuser, it is not a useful response if the patient genuinely wants
to improve her health or the doctor’s. Rather than denounce the hypocrisy of the accuser, the
goal should be to undertake a conscientious effort to determine what can be done to improve
the quality of life.
53. HARTFORD CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 21 (Spiegel).
54. HARTFORD CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 25-26 (An-Na’im).
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gime. There are a number of telling examples where the United
States has removed itself from full participation with the international
community. For example, the United States has been in serious arrears in its payments to the United Nations, a solemn obligation of
U.N. membership.55 It conspicuously asserts its own sovereignty in
order to shelter it from international obligations that other states are
willing to assume. The United States also frequently urges that there
be significant changes during the process of drafting international
human rights conventions, only to refuse to sign or to ratify the convention once it has been adopted by the remainder of the international community.56 When it does ratify a human rights convention,
the United States often does so only after interposing a number of
“reservations, understandings, and declarations.”57 Finally, although
the United States files its annual country reports on the human
rights practices of other states, it has been delinquent in filing reports
on its own human rights practices, as required under such conventions as the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination.58 For foreign observers, it can be
troubling when the United States avoids full participation in the international human rights process, but then insists that other countries must adhere to international freedom of religion standards as
they are interpreted by the United States.59
The U.S. Congress could enhance significantly the Department
of State’s ability to promote international standards by helping to
make the United States a full participant in the international system.
Measures include ensuring that debts are paid to international or55. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 2.
56. Perhaps the most recent example is the United States’ refusal to sign the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (as corrected by
the procès-verbaux of Nov. 10, 1998, and July 12, 1999).
57. One of many such examples is the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. For a typical criticism of this practice, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT
1999, at 386 (1999).
58. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. While it is appropriate to criticize
the United States in this regard, it also should be noted that many other states similarly are
delinquent and that the valid criticism also applies to others.
59. This is another version of the hypocrisy argument that was made in Criticism 5
above. Here, the emphasis is not on internal U.S. human rights behavior but on American participation in the international community. As with the preceding criticism, there is some merit
to the argument, except when it is overstated or used to excuse others’ failures to comply with
human rights norms.
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ganizations of which the United States is a member; ratifying international conventions; and ratifying conventions without attaching
reservations, understandings, and declarations that undermine the
merits of the conventions.
It is, nevertheless, inaccurate to suggest that the United States
always acts alone on issues related to religious freedom. In the
United Nations Human Rights Commission, for example, Ireland
traditionally takes the lead for resolutions on religious freedom, and
the United States is a continuing supporter of Ireland’s efforts.60 The
United States was one of the original supporters of the resolution
that created the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief and has supported the renewal of his mandate.61 In the OSCE, the United States has been a
constant supporter of efforts to advance religious freedom. This
strong support was manifest, for example, at the 1996 Seminar in
Warsaw on Freedom of Religion and the creation of the Advisory
Panel of Experts on Religion. The U.S. strongly supported Norway’s
leadership in the first OSCE “Supplementary Meeting on Freedom
of Religion,” which met in Vienna early in March of 1999. The
United States joined with a number of European states in opposing
the adoption of Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and
Belief. It has worked regularly with other countries to free their nationals who have been arrested for practicing religion in third countries.
Critics of IRFA typically are unaware of these efforts by the
United States to involve itself multilaterally in issues related to freedom of religion and belief. From the author’s experience, the critics
who accuse the United States for acting as a “Lone Ranger” are not
fully aware of the many multilateral efforts that the United States has
undertaken. At the same time, the United States can and should undertake more multilateral efforts to enlist the support of those governments that are relatively sympathetic to religious freedom.
The United States could strengthen its moral authority and influence in promoting freedom of religion if it were seen as a more
60. See, e.g., Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief, U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/33 (2000); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/39 (1999).
61. See, e.g., David Weissbrodt, The Three “Theme” Special Rapporteurs of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 685, 695-97 (1986).
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consistent and engaged actor in the international community and if
it sought to promote all recognized freedoms. But the critics of
IRFA and the United States would do well both to recognize the
multilateral efforts that the United States has made and, much more
importantly, to urge other governments to engage more fully in the
goal of promoting freedom of religion and belief.
IV. CONCLUSION
As long as foreign observers believe that the United States is
promoting a peculiarly American notion of religious freedom, the effectiveness of the United States’ efforts will be reduced. Religious
freedom will best be advanced only when international standards are
understood to be genuinely international and when the United
States is seen as participating in a genuinely international effort.
IRFA’s critics, however, frequently caricature the law and the efforts of the United States by loosely employing clichés such as “Lone
Ranger,” “imperialism,” and “market-oriented religion.” Such rhetorical criticisms are made without fully understanding how American diplomats actually engage other governments in discussions regarding discrimination on the basis of religion. Admittedly, the
United States must be very careful about how it approaches the sensitive issue of freedom of religion. But its critics also should be
equally careful about how they characterize the United States’ efforts. There is an important need, for all who are concerned by the
issue of the promotion of religious freedom, to engage in a serious
and nonpolemical discussion of the issues.

865

GUN-FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

866

9/25/00 9:40 PM

[2000

